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In a further attempt to convince the Court that he
maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy, Smith
argued that the phone company ordinarily does not re-
cord local calls. He contended that since he was making a
local call to McDonough, his expectation of privacy, as to
her number, was "legitimate." The majority discarded
that contention, noting that whether a call is local or long
distance is not the basis for a constitutional distinction.
Regardless of what numbers the phone company ordi-
narily records, the risk was assumed that numerical infor-
mation would be divulged to the police.
The Court concluded that Smith had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the numbers he dialed, and that,
even if he did, his expectation was not "legitimate."
Because the petitioner failed to meet the test mandated
by Katz, the Court held that the use of a pen register was
not a "search." It further held that since there was no
"search" the failure of the police to obtain a warrant did
not constitute reversible error and that the Court of
Appeals of Maryland had properly affirmed the ruling of
the Criminal Court of Baltimore City in its holding that
pen register evidence should not be suppressed.
Justice Stewart, with whom Justice Brennan joined,
filed a dissenting opinion. Although he also found Katz to
be controlling, Justice Stewart was of the opinion that a
telephone subscriber has a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in the numbers he dials. He reasoned that the
information obtained by a pen register emanates from
private conduct within a person's home or office-places
that are entitled to Fourth Amendment protection-and
that the numbers dialed are not without "content."
Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joined,
also filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Marshall noted that
telephone users may not know that the phone company
records calls for internal reasons, and therefore users do
not expect that the numbers they dial will be made avail-
able to the government.
Individuals may reveal certain information to third par-
ties for a limited business purpose without expecting that
the information will be released to others for other pur-
poses. Justice Marshall also rejected the majority's
rationale that petitioner "assumed the risk" that the num-
bers he dialed would be revealed to the police. He felt
that this argument was misplaced because implicit in the
concept of assumption of risk is the notion of free choice.
Since the telephone has become a personal and business
necessity, individuals have no realistic alternative.
Agreeing with the dissenting opinions filed in the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, Justice Marshall concluded that the
use of pen registers is an extensive intrusion, and that
evidence obtained as a result of their use should be
suppressed unless the police secure a prior warrant.
* * * * * * * * *
Right To Counsel May Be
Implicitly Waived
by Mark D. Woodard
In North Carolina v. Butler, - U.S. __, 99 S. Ct.
1755 (1979), the Supreme Court ruled that a criminal
defendant under custodial interrogation need not waive
his right to a lawyer orally or in writing: a waiver can be
inferred from the facts and circumstances of each case.
By so holding, the Supreme Court continues to narrow
the scope of the so-called "Warren" court's emphasis on
the rights of the accused.
Shortly after Butler's arrest, FBI agents took him to
their office for questioning. Martinez testified to the fol-
lowing: after determining (method not stated) that Butler
had an 11th grade education and was literate, he was
given the Bureau's "Advice of Rights" form which he
read and stated he understood. However, he refused to
sign the form. At trial, Butler stated he was told that
although he was not required to speak or sign the form,
he was "requested" to answer questions. The defendant
replied, "I will talk to you but I am not signing any
form." Id. at 1756. He then proceeded to make inculpa-
tory statements. FBI agent Martinez stated that Butler said
nothing when advised of his right to a lawyer and at no
time asked for one.
At the conclusion of the agent's testimony, the defense
moved to suppress the evidence of Butler's incriminating
statements on the ground that he had not waived his right
to the assistance of counsel at the time the statements
were made.
The trial court denied the motion reasoning that Butler
effectively waived his rights, including the right to have an
attorney present, by his willingness to answer questions
after reading the "Advice of Rights" form. The defen-
dant's incriminating statements were admitted into evi-
dence and the jury convicted him of all charges (kidnap-
ping, armed robbery and felonious assault).
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial
court erred in admitting the defendant's inculpatory state-
ments. North Carolina v. Butler, 295 N.C. 250, 244
S.E.2d 410 (1978). In its view, the defendant never
waived (in writing or orally) his right to an attorney during
custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). The court interpreted Miranda as "providing in
plain language that waiver of the right to counsel during
interrogation will not be recognized unless such waiver is
,specifically made' after the Miranda warnings have been
given." 244 S.E.2d at 413. See also, State v. Blackman,
280 N.C. 42, 49-50, 185 S.E.2d 123, 127-128; State v.
Thackes, 251 N.C. 447, 453-454, 189 S.E.2d 145, 149-
150 (1972). The defendant must expressly waive his
FORUM
Sixth Amendment right to an attorney during custodial
interrogation according to North Carolina's interpretation
of Miranda.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. It held
that a defendant can also waive his Miranda rights during
custodial interrogation by his words and actions.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, began the
opinion by quoting from Miranda:
If the interrogation continues without the presence of
an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy bur-
den rests on the government to demonstrate that the
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his priv-
ilege against self-incrimination and his right to re-
tained or appointed counsel. 384 U.S. at 475.
The majority concluded that the Miranda decision
mandated ". . . that an express statement can constitute a
waiver, and that silence alone after such warnings cannot
do so. But the Court (in Miranda) did not hold that such
an express statement is indispensable to a finding of
waiver." 99 S. Ct. at 1757.
The express written or oral waiver is often likely to
indicate the validity of the waiver, but it is not "inevitably
either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver." Id. The
Court argues that the question is not one of form, but,
rather, whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily
waived his rights. Even though courts must presume that
a defendant did not waive his Miranda rights, in "at least
some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the ac-
tions and words of the person interrogated." Id.
Justice Stewart reasoned that the per se rule, i.e., a lack
of an express statement makes a waiver per se invalid,
does not address itself to the uniqueness of each interro-
gation. Rather, the opinion concluded, the question of
waiver of any constitutional right must take into account
"the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the
case, including the background, experience and conduct
of the accused." Id. at 1758, citing Johnson v. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937).
Other courts who have considered the question, have
also opted for this flexible standard. In fact, ten of the
eleven circuits as well as the courts of seventeen states
"have held that an explicit statement of waiver is not
invariably necessary to support a finding that the defen-
dant waived the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Miranda case." 99 S. Ct. at 1759.
Justice Brennan wrote the dissent in which Justices
Marshall and Stevens joined. The dissenting opinion
emphasized the interpretation of Miranda that no effec-
tive waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can
be recognized unless specifically made after the defen-
dant has been informed of his rights. The minority cites
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962) "that in the
absence of an allegation of an affirmative waiver ... there
is no disputed fact question requiring a hearing." Id. at
516.
They note that the majority's holding allows the indi-
vidual court to infer a waiver based upon the actions and
words of the person interrogated. They insist the majority
ignored the basic premise of Miranda which requires that
an ambiguity be interpreted against the interrogator. This
premise is based on the recognition that there is "compul-
sion inherent in custodial interrogation, with its purpose
to subjugate the individual to the will of the examiner.
Under such conditions, only the most explicit waiver of
rights can be considered knowingly and freely given." 99
S. Ct. at 1760.
The dissent found this case presented a clear example
of the need for an express waiver requirement. The ma-
jority assumed that Butler understood the written copy of
rights given him by the FBI. However, the minority con-
tends (1) "there was a dispute over whether the defen-
dant could read." If he couldn't read there was clearly no
waiver; and (2) even if he could read "there is no reason
to believe that his oral statements which followed a refus-
al to sign a written waiver form, were intended to signify
relinquishment of his rights." Id.
The dissent expressed its concern that courts faced with
actions and words of uncertain meaning will come to
quite different conclusions on similar facts. Requiring a
defendant to explicitly waive his rights would act as a
clarification to prevent future appeals over what actions
and what circumstances constitute a waiver.
Conclusion
The "Warren" court's pro-defendant criminal proce-
dure philosophy is at odds with that of the "Burger" court
and so the Justices will continue to narrow and limit the
Miranda decision.
Three justices in the Miranda decision remain on the
Court today. Justices White and Stewart (with the major-
ity in Butler) dissented in Miranda. Justice Brennan (with
the dissent in Butler) was a member of the majority in
Miranda. If Butler had been decided by the "Warren"
Court, it would most probably have affirmed the North
Carolina decision and found no waiver.
Perhaps those who received the "Warren" court's de-
cisions with dismay because of that court's noticeable
preference for an accused's rights will not rejoice in Butler
quite so heartily when they realize the probable effects of
the decision. Now, an already burdened judicial system
must ascertain in myriad factual situations, whether,
under the totality of circumstances, the defendant waived
his Constitutional rights.
Miranda mandates some kind of waiver. An express
waiver requirement would just make that requirement
explicit. In Justice Brennan's words: "Had agent Martinez
simply elicited a clear answer from Willie Butler to the
question, 'Do you waive your right to a lawyer?,' this
journey through three courts would not have been neces-
sary." Id.
